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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the connection between the recent economic recession and 
an increase in trade disputes between the United States and China. Overall, I conclude 
political factors exacerbated by the recession, rather than economic considerations, were 
the catalyst for an increase in disputes. Misconceptions by the American public 
concerning the importance of manufacturing in the U.S. economy, political rhetoric, and 
fear of China’s rise led the United States to implement a series of economically ill-
advised protectionist tariffs on Chinese goods. These tariffs in turn lead to an increase in 
WTO disputes between the United States and China. Given the severe economic 
consequences and the growing importance of Sino-American trade relations, it is 
imperative the United States actively seeks to curb protectionism and reduce trade 
disputes with China. 
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Introduction 
“I will go anywhere in the world to open new markets for American 
products.  And I will not stand by when our competitors don’t play by the 
rules.  We’ve brought trade cases against China at nearly twice the rate as the 
last administration – and it’s made a difference.  Over a thousand Americans are 
working today because we stopped a surge in Chinese tires.  But we need to do 
more… It’s not fair when foreign manufacturers have a leg up on ours only 
because they’re heavily subsidized.” 
- President Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union 
 In recent years, China bashing has vaulted to the top of American political 
rhetoric. In the 2012 election, presidential hopeful Mitt Romney and President Obama 
jockeyed to appear more hawkish towards China than their opponent, each claiming their 
policies best check the “cheating” Chinese and protect critical American industry and 
jobs. Their recent sparring is a small snippet of a larger debate that has been occurring in 
boardrooms, living rooms, and the Situation Room over how to address the emergence of 
China as a world power. China’s state-capitalism and enigmatic foreign policy inflames 
fears concerning the impact of their growth on the U.S economy, and spurned a recent 
backlash against Chinese goods, including the tariff on Chinese tires alluded to in 
Obama’s 2012 State of the Union address. The political contentiousness surrounding the 
pervasiveness of imports from China, as well as protectionist measures by the U.S., have 
increased drastically in the last several years, coinciding with 2008 financial crisis and 
subsequent recession. Did the macroeconomic shocks of the recession exacerbate fears of 
imports from China, and lead to an increase in U.S./China trade disputes?  
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 China’s Communist Party remains heavily involved in the country’s economic 
decision making, prompting conflict with Western liberal democracies, particularly the 
U.S., that espouse free trade and economic liberalization. These conflicts have been 
especially apparent since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 
WTO membership forced China to reform some of its trade practices and comply with 
international standards, and provided China and the U.S. a forum to voice their trade 
grievances against one another. The first five years of China’s WTO participation 
produced relatively few trade conflicts with the U.S. However, since the second half of 
2007, when signs of the global financial crisis and economic recession began to appear, 
the rate of China specific protectionist tariffs implemented by the U.S. against China has 
doubled, while the number of formal disputes between the two countries has tripled.  
I argue that during the recession, political pressures, not economic theory, led the 
U.S. to dramatically increase protectionist trade measures against China, triggering an 
increase in Sino-American trade disputes.1 The recession reinforced the U.S. bias that 
trading with China’s pseudo-capitalist economy is harmful to the domestic economy. 
Politicians and the public alike have long been leery of China’s rapid economic growth, 
state-controlled economy, and expanding exports to the U.S. This is largely because 
imports from China threaten the domestic manufacturing industry, which is viewed by 
many as the backbone of the American economy (Deloitte 2011). As unemployment 
skyrocketed, cheap and abundant Chinese goods were blamed for undercutting domestic 
manufacturing, leading to political backlash and protectionist tariffs against imports from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is evidence and research that suggest China’s own domestic politics and policies play a large role in 
perpetuating trade disputes. This paper will acknowledge those factors, though focus almost exclusively on 
analyzing U.S. policy decisions. 
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China.  These protectionist measures subsequently led China to initiate a series of WTO 
disputes with the U.S. Claiming the U.S. has a “bias” does not imply that China never 
violates international trade agreements, or that imports from China do not negatively 
affect some segments of the U.S. economy. Rather, it reveals how “cracking down” on 
China leads to policies that are detrimental to the U.S. economy. 
While many dismiss these recent disputes as growing pains in the trade relations 
between the world’s two largest economies, this optimistic view does not tell the full 
story. China passed Germany in 2009 and Japan in 2010 to assume its place as the 
world’s second largest economy, though the recent pace U.S./China trade conflicts far 
outstrips China’s economic growth. Although the industries affected by trade disputes are 
materially small relative to all U.S./China trade, the trend of increased politicization in 
U.S./China trade relations is troubling. Politicization leads to policies directly harmful to 
the U.S. economy, and increases the threat of an economically catastrophic trade war 
with China. Therefore, it is important U.S. policymakers are aware of these risks, and 
formulate strategies to ease economic and domestic political tensions. Ultimately, the 
best way to significantly reduce trade disputes and improve economic relations is to 
espouse greater trade liberalization and cooperation. However, before this can occur the 
public and policymakers alike must be willing to reconsider their views on the Chinese 
threat to the U.S. economy. 
Economic Context 
 Historically, macroeconomic downturns correlate with a rise of protectionist 
policies (Bagwell & Staiger 2003). The most common type of protectionist measures are 
Temporary Trade Barriers (TTBs), WTO approved tariffs allowed under certain 
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circumstances in order to slow imports and protect national industries. However, when 
TTBs are applied outside the WTO framework, the country on which the tariff was 
imposed can file a complaint in the WTO protesting the TTB. Contesting TTBs is one of 
the most common causes of formal disputes within the WTO. The 2007-2009 financial 
meltdown is shown by one study to have led the U.S. to implement more TTBs, though 
not as many as predicted. This depressed number of TTBs is attributed to exchange rate 
movements rendering some protectionist policies unnecessary, and increased global 
political pressure to adhere to established trade agreements (Bown and Crowley 2012).  
This same study also reveals that before the financial crisis and recession, import 
protection, particularly by the U.S. and E.U., was chiefly targeted towards countries with 
contracting economies. However, during the recent financial crisis this pattern reversed, 
and import protection policies are now directed towards countries exhibiting economic 
growth (Bown and Crowley 2012). This finding is important for U.S./China trade 
relations, as many of their WTO disputes have been over the U.S. implementing TTBs 
against China, currently one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Other studies 
contend the total number of protectionist trade measures implemented by the U.S. in the 
wake of the financial crisis was insubstantial, possibly due to the domestic bailout and 
stimulus package, though protectionist measures on a country by country basis were not 
evaluated (Wolfe 2012). Non-tariff barriers, like domestic stimulus spending and “Buy 
National” programs were also instituted during the recession, which amount to de facto 
protectionist measures (Larch and Lechthaler 2011).   
The financial crisis led many scholars to predict challenges for U.S./China trade 
relations in the years ahead, as the economic downturn increases the likelihood that 
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countries will abandon (or bend) the rule-based system of the WTO, leading to further 
disputes and possible retaliation (Bown 2009). While the WTO system has not been 
abandoned, it has been strained: since China joined the WTO on December 11, 2001 
China and the U.S. have been involved in more disputes than any other pair of countries, 
with most disputes coming since 2007. Since then, the U.S. has been involved in 20 
WTO disputes with China, compared to only seven with Japan, the E.U., Canada, and 
Mexico combined. U.S./China disputes have composed 18 percent of all WTO disputes 
during this period (WTO 2013). Recent U.S./China WTO disputes reveal a clear pattern 
of the U.S. contesting “offensive” Chinese policies, those giving Chinese exports an 
advantage in the U.S. market, while China contests “defensive” U.S. policies that shelter 
domestic industry from Chinese competition (Hufbauer &Woollacott 2010). This pattern 
is attributed to the growing pains of U.S./China trade relations, but the authors also 
predict these trends will persist and possibly escalate into the future, a forecast that has 
proven accurate.  
A core reason for the U.S.’s “defensive” trade policies is to shield the domestic 
manufacturing industry from Chinese competition. The desire for a manufacturing driven 
economy persists in the American psyche, despite evidence that this is unnecessary for a 
healthy U.S. economy. A recent survey revealed 86 percent of Americans believe “the 
manufacturing industry is very important to our economic prosperity,” and 83 percent 
agreed “The U.S. needs a more strategic approach to developing its manufacturing base” 
(Deloitte 2011). However, the U.S. has been pivoting away from a manufacturing driven 
economy towards a service driven economy for decades: the share of Americans 
employed in manufacturing was 21 percent in 1979, but down to around 12 percent today 
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(Gross 2011). Meanwhile, the service sector now employs more than 80 percent of U.S. 
workers (International Trade Commission 1999). In a developed country like the U.S., a 
focus on services such as finance, law, and technology that utilize an educated, 
innovative workforce makes more sense than a manufacturing based economy, where 
success is largely based on the availability of cheap labor. Indeed, the U.S. currently has 
a trade surplus with China in services that is expected to reach $60 billion by 2015 (Gross 
2011), compared to its 2012 $315 billion dollar deficit in trade in goods with China 
(Census Bureau 2013).  
 Despite public sympathies, the U.S. share of global manufactured goods exported 
dropped from 19 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2011, while during the same period 
China’s increased from seven percent to 21 percent (Shilling 2013), due to the U.S.’s 
inability to compete with cheap Chinese labor. Even as China moves up the value chain 
from textiles and shoes to high-tech manufacturing, that most favored in the U.S., 
China’s average hourly wage in manufacturing was $1.15 in 2011, compared to $35.53 in 
the U.S. (Schilling 2013) While manufacturing will never completely disappear from the 
U.S., in many sectors it lacks the competiveness to be viable in the global marketplace. 
Indeed, empirical research shows imported Chinese manufactured goods cause limited, 
regional unemployment in the U.S. labor markets with which they directly compete 
(David et. al 2012). Yet rather than viewing these trends as a change in comparative 
advantage and a sign the U.S. economy should re-orient its focus to services and 
technology where it is most competitive, the public views these manufacturing trends as a 
sign of the demise of the American economy, and largely blames China.  
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China’s government involvement in the economy reinforces these critiques. The 
U.S. has long worried trading with non-free market economies causes significant damage 
to the domestic economy, embodied in provisions allowing otherwise illegal protectionist 
measures to be taken by the U.S. against “non-market” economies in the Trade Act of 
1974. China’s state-run enterprises and government subsidies in some industries foster 
the notion in the U.S. that Chinese manufacturers only outcompete their American 
counterparts by cheating. The public believes if this cheating was curbed U.S. 
manufactured goods would be the most demanded in the world (Obama 2012). However, 
as demonstrated above, wages, not government intervention, are the driver of China’s 
comparative advantage in manufacturing. 
Recognizing the public’s views on manufacturing, politicians seek political gain 
by associating themselves with the manufacturing industry. For example, during the 2010 
Congressional and gubernatorial elections candidates from both parties spend tens of 
millions of dollars on “advertisements suggesting that their opponents have been too 
sympathetic to China and, as a result, Americans have suffered” (Chen 2010). In the lead 
up to those elections, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi encouraged Democratic candidates to 
highlight instances of Republicans supporting policies that may lead to job growth in 
China after internal polling revealed voters strongly favored eliminating tax breaks for 
companies doing business in China (Chen 2010).  
President Obama made supporting manufacturing a major element of his 2012 
reelection campaign. Of his 242 recorded campaign rallies, he mentioned manufacturing 
in 231 of them (2012 Presidential Election Documents 2012). Delivering speeches at 
abandoned and run-down factories, he promised to “bring manufacturing back,” despite 
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insistence from many of his top economic advisors that banking on manufacturing was a 
losing proposition (Goldfarb 2012). Job creation, particularly in manufacturing, remained 
a consistent theme throughout his campaign, and a particularly salient issue given the 
recession and high unemployment. These campaign promises translated directly into his 
actual policies, as Obama has set a goal of adding one million manufacturing jobs to the 
U.S. economy by 2016 (Organization for Action 2013). Appealing to the public’s desire 
for increased manufacturing cuts across partisan lines. While attacking Obama’s policies 
for requiring too much government intervention, Romney also appealed to popular 
sentiment and called for more manufacturing jobs to return to the U.S. 
 While China poses a threat to the U.S. manufacturing industry, this alone does not 
explain the U.S. targeting them for protectionist trade measures, as other manufacturing 
oriented countries saw record lows in TTBs leveraged against them by the U.S. during 
the recession. Rather, there is something specific about the Chinese system that foments 
public ire: China’s state-capitalism and growing political and military strength challenge 
Americans’ understanding of the world (Schuman 2011). As explained, “China appears 
to be challenging not just today’s economic orthodoxy and order, but the world’s political 
and military framework as well. China isn’t content just to sell more TV sets to the world, 
like Japan. The Chinese want to have more control over the world. And they want to use 
their economic clout to get it. Or so we think” (Schuman 2011).  
Regardless of its validity, the notion that China’s continued economic expansion 
will lead to massive shifts in global political power is prominent in the mindset of 
Americans. A recent survey shows 52 percent of Americans “view China’s emergence as 
a world power as a major threat to the U.S.” As for jobs, 71 percent of the American 
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believe loss of U.S. jobs to China is “a very serious problem,” though tellingly only 12 
percent of scholars hold this view (Pew Research 2012). Therefore, constraining the 
government-controlled Chinese economy, even at the expense of American consumers, 
placates political demands and appeases those concerned with both the domestic 
economy and America’s place in global politics. 
Methodology 
This paper utilizes a Poisson regression model to analyze U.S. implementation of 
TTBs on its 14 largest trade partners between 1990 and 2012. Poisson models are used to 
model count data, meaning the outcome variable values are assumed to be non-negative 
whole numbers, an appropriate assumption for modeling the number of TTBs 
implemented by the U.S. This model will help conclude if, independent of the economic 
impact of the recession, the U.S. has increased the number of TTBs it levies against 
China since the recession began. If this relationship can is proved, it will strongly suggest 
political factors, rather than economic ones, are driving recent U.S./China trade disputes. 
Cases for the model are a combination of half-year period (either quarters 1-2 or 
3-4) ranging from Q3-Q4 1990 to Q1-Q2 2012, and country. The countries used are the 
14 trade partners that are the most common targets of U.S. TTBs, which is virtually the 
same as the U.S.’s 14 largest trade partners: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the E.U., 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and 
Turkey. All values for the E.U., even for time periods before the E.U. was formally 
established, are an aggregation of the E.U.-27, the 27 nations that currently make up the 
European Union. These cases begin in 1996. Cases from Taiwan date from the second 
half of 1999. The outcome variable is the total number of TTBs implemented by the U.S. 
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against a country in a specific half year time period (TTB). TTB comes from the World 
Bank Global Antidumping Database, and is an aggregation of four different types of 
tariffs and duties.  
The controlled for variables are volume of U.S. imports (U.S. imports) from a 
given country in a given period, percentage increase in U.S imports from a given country 
compared to the pervious time period (Import change), a variable for time (Time), 
whether or not the time period is before or after the beginning of the recession 
(Recession), GDP growth rate of the U.S. trade partner (GDP growth), change in U.S. 
unemployment rate from the previous time period (Unemployment), and Country. U.S. 
imports is measured in $1,000s, and is lagged by one period, as in common in these 
models, on the assumption that this variable impacts TTB by the policy responses it 
garners. Controlling for U.S. imports accounts for the effect of scale of trade on TTB. 
Each time period is assigned a numerical value from 1 to 44, which is tested as a 
continuous variable, Time. Time helps compare different time periods where the U.S. may 
have been implementing more or fewer TTBs. Data for GDP Growth measures domestic 
GDP growth for the U.S. trade partner in a half-year period, controlling for the effect of 
economic growth on TTBs levied. GDP growth data comes from a combination of the 
OECD and World Bank databases.  
 For some time periods and countries only annual GDP growth data is available. 
In these cases, annual growth is halved, and used as an estimate for semi-annual GDP 
growth for both Q1-Q2 and Q3-Q4 of that year. This is consistent with the data for when 
semi-annual growth is available: for those cases, if you add the two semi-annual growth 
rates together, it sums to the annual growth rate. Values are again lagged by one time 
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period. For Recession, half-year periods from Q1-Q2 2008, when the first major effects 
of the recession were felt in the U.S., to Q1-Q2 2012 are considered to be during the 
recession period. Recession controls for potential changes in TTB since the recession’s 
onset. For these three variables (U.S. Imports, Time, and Recession), interactions are 
taken for when the country is China, in order to investigate if these variables affect China 
differently than they do other countries.2 
Unemployment measures change in the U.S. seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rate, and is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unemployment rates from 
June are used for Q1-Q2 periods, and rates from December are used for Q3-Q4. The 
change in unemployment rate is found by subtracting the unemployment rate for a 
particular time period from the unemployment rate of the previous period. Rates are then 
lagged one time period. As protectionism is typically higher during recessions, 
Unemployment controls for how the state of the job market affects TTB. The variable 
Country demonstrates the difference in TTB implementation between other U.S. trade 
partners and China. In all models considered here, China is the baseline to which other 
countries are compared, meaning the value produced by the regression for each country is 
the relative level of TTBs compared to China (China, therefore, does not appear in the 
model because it would have a value of 0).  
Case studies on trade disputes regarding tires and solar panels explore the effect 
of domestic politics, versus economic factors shown in the model, on the increase in 
U.S./China trade disputes. Both of these cases are WTO disputes instigated by the U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Taking an interaction just when Country is China, instead of an interaction for each country, shows how 
China’s reaction to these variables compares to the aggregation of all other countries. Including interactions 
for all countries shows the same general trends as the approach I took, but inflates standard errors, includes 
too many variables, and tends to over fit the model.  
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enacting a TTB on a specific Chinese industry, and China subsequently filing a WTO 
complaint against the TTB. While the U.S. has instigated 13 WTO disputes against China 
since 2007, 10 have dealt with U.S. exports to China, and are thus unrelated to this 
analysis. The three dealing with Chinese exports were all caused by the U.S. protesting 
either Chinese government subsidies or predatory dumping. While these would be useful 
cases to consider, subsidies and dumping are the same factors that lead the U.S. to 
implement TTBs.  
Therefore, cases where China files a WTO complaint contesting U.S. TTBs are 
very similar to U.S. initiated disputes, and have the additional benefit of demonstrating 
how China responds to U.S. protectionist trade measures. Of the six cases involving 
China disputing U.S. TTB implementation, the tires and solar panels cases comprise the 
largest industries, and were most covered in media and academia. Admittedly, the larger 
literature available on these cases does make it easier to explicate the politics and 
interests groups at work in invoking protectionist measures. Nevertheless, the cases are 
representative of all WTO disputes, whether instituted by the U.S. or China, involving 
U.S. attempts to slow imports from China. All such cases involve protectionist measures 
implemented by the U.S. justified by rapid increases in imports from China, and most 
include accusations of Chinese government subsidies and predatory dumping. In all these 
cases China has denied the accusations and claimed the U.S. protectionism is illegal. The 
cases selected highlight all the components of this pattern, and point to the broader issues 
underlying U.S./China trade disputes. 
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Data Results 
Figure 1 (below) plots the outcome variable TTB versus time period for each 
country. The recession began in the very beginning of 2008, with warning signs 
appearing as early as 2007. As shown, before 2007 many countries had similar numbers 
of TTBs levied against them, but after the onset of the financial crisis and recession 
China’s number of TTBs increased significantly, and became far larger than any other 
countries’. However, in order to determine if this increase in TTBs is due to the recession 
itself and is truly unique to China, the aforementioned variables likely to affect TTB must 
be controlled for. The full regression output for three models is shown in Table 1, also 
below. 
Figure 1   
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Table 1
Poisson Regression for TTBs implemented by the U.S. by time period and Country
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
U.S. Imports3 8.51-09*** 
(7.14-10) 
5.32-09*** 
(1.26-09) 
-1.02-08*** 
(2.69-09) 
U.S. Imports, 
Country in China 
  1.33-08*** 
(3.22-09) 
Import Change 5.56-03** 
(2.32-03) 
4.93-04 
(3.10-03) 
2.60-03 
(3.03-03) 
Time -1.06-02*** 
(2.91-03) 
 -9.58-03** 
(3.93-03) 
Time, Country in 
China 
  1.85-02** 
(8.42-03) 
Recession -1.14*** 
(0.14) 
-0.98*** 
(0.15) 
-1.48*** 
(0.22) 
Recession, Country 
is China 
  1.41*** 
(0.34) 
GDP Growth 0.11*** 
(1.35-02) 
-1.29-02 
(1.90-02) 
-2.63-02 
(1.84-02) 
Unemployment 
Change 
0.47*** 
(7.68-02) 
0.26*** 
(7.82-02) 
0.25*** 
(7.44-02) 
Australia  -2.27*** 
(0.29) 
-1.78*** 
(0.33) 
Brazil  -1.20*** 
(0.20) 
-0.65** 
(0.26) 
Canada  -1.57*** 
(0.18) 
0.31 
(0.33) 
E.U.  -1.24*** 
(0.18) 
1.01*** 
(0.37) 
India  -0.93*** 
(0.17) 
-0.40* 
(0.24) 
Indonesia  -1.48*** 
(0.21) 
-0.96*** 
(0.27) 
Japan  -1.13*** 
(0.17) 
0.24 
(0.29) 
Mexico  -1.44*** 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.28) 
South Africa   -1.55*** 
(0.22) 
-6.63-02 
(0.27) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Coefficients for the U.S. Imports variable are so small because U.S. Imports is measured in thousands of 
dollars, but actual import values are in the range of tens of billions of dollars. Therefore, even with very 
small coefficients, this variable is influential in the model. 
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South Korea  -0.77*** 
(0.17) 
-6.63-02 
(7.44-02) 
Switzerland  -2.70*** 
(0.34) 
-2.21*** 
(0.38) 
Taiwan  -1.52*** 
(0.27) 
-0.75** 
(0.32) 
Turkey  -1.32*** 
(0.29) 
-0.83** 
(0.37) 
N=587, Significance codes: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1% 
 
Model 1: 
Null deviance: 1330.8 on 586 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 1075.2 on 580 degrees of freedom 
 
Model 2: 
Null deviance: 1330.83 on 586 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 869.05 on 567 degrees of freedom 
 
Model 3: 
Null deviance: 1330.83 on 586 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 777.65 on 564 degrees of freedom 
 
 Controlling for major measures of economic health and bilateral trade relations, these 
models point to non-economic factors influencing recent U.S. implementation of TTBs on China.  
In Model 1, which does not include the variable Country or any interactions, Time and Recession 
are negative and significant at the 1 percent level, implying that as time progressed, and 
particularly since the recession, the U.S. has been implementing fewer TTBs. However, this 
output contradicts Figure 1, which shows a vast uptick in TTBs against China since 2007. To 
account for the difference between countries, the Country variable is added in Model 2. In Model 
2, the coefficient for every country is negative and significant, demonstrating that, holding other 
variables constant, China has more TTBs imposed on it than any other country. Adding 
interactions between China and U.S. imports, Recession, and Time in Model 3 demonstrates how 
these variables contribute to the difference between China and other countries. Model 3 has the 
lowest residual deviance and is the best overall model, and therefore will be used for analysis. 
The only substantial difference between Models 1 and 2 and Model 3 is that U.S. imports is 
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positive in Model 1 and 2 but negative in Model 3. This is likely because the influence of China 
on U.S. imports changes the coefficient when an interaction is not included. 
In Model 3, U.S. imports is significant at the 1 percent level and negative, indicating that 
holding all other factors constant, the more the U.S. imports from a country the less likely it is to 
impose TTBs on that country. This makes particular sense in the context of the U.S.’s relations 
with their large trading partners who are also strong political allies, such as Canada, Mexico, and 
the E.U. However, this same trend does not hold for China. An interaction between China and 
U.S. imports is positive, and also significant at the 1 percent level, demonstrating that China’s 
pattern differs from general U.S. trade trends, and importing more from China in fact leads to 
more TTB implementation. Unemployment is both significant and positive, demonstrating that 
increases in domestic unemployment lead to an increase in TTBs in the proceeding period. This 
finding is expected given the existing literature that macroeconomic shocks and increased 
protectionism are correlated, as unemployment is the most obvious impact of economic 
recessions (Bagwell & Staiger 2003). GDP growth is not significant, indicating that the 
economic growth of the trade partner does not actually impact their trade disagreements with the 
U.S. While this finding is surprising, historically the U.S. targeted countries with contracting 
economies, while only recently switching towards tariffs against countries growing economically 
(Bown and Crowley 2012). These factors may have over time canceled each other out, leading 
GDP growth to be insignificant in the aggregate.  
 The Country variables show how other U.S. trade partners, holding all else constant, 
compare to China in having U.S. TTBs leveraged against them. Australia, Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey all have a statistically significant 
smaller number of TTBs leveraged against them than China, with only the E.U. having 
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significantly more. This means compared to many of the U.S.’s other trading partners, China, for 
none of the reasons controlled for in this model, has more TTBs leveraged against them. This 
points to unquantifiable factors, such as the aforementioned desire to protect domestic 
manufacturing and fear of China’s authoritarian political system, influencing U.S./China trade 
dynamics. Interestingly, the three countries with positive coefficients (though not all are 
statistically significant) are the E.U., Canada, and Japan, three of the United States’ four largest 
trade partners. This finding may imply that bilateral trade flow volume was not completely 
controlled for in the U.S. imports variable, and that countries with which the U.S. trades more are 
more susceptible to TTBs, though the results are inconclusive. 
 Regardless, the data is clear that relative to other countries, TTBs on China have risen in 
recent years. The Time and Recession variables demonstrate that since 1990, and especially since 
2008, the overall number of TTBs implemented by the U.S., holding constant various 
macroeconomic factors, has decreased. While Time shows this is a continuous trend, Recession 
reveals this pattern is significantly more pronounced since 2008. Pushes by the WTO and other 
international bodies for economic liberalization and free trade account for much of this finding, 
and the global trend towards less protectionist measures became especially apparent during the 
recession (Wolfe 2012). However, despite the overall trend towards using fewer TTBs, China 
shows the exact opposite pattern. The interaction between China and Time is much larger than 
the Time variable itself, indicating that as Time increases, China sees more and more TTBs 
implemented on it by the U.S., with the highest predicted number of TTBs coming in the most 
recent years.  
 During the recession period, holding all other factors constant, the U.S. is estimated to 
impose 1.48 fewer TTBs per country per time period. However, the interaction between China 
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and Recession is significant and has a value of 1.41, meaning the trend towards fewer TTBs is 
essentially nullified for China. China has not seen the easing of protectionist policies experienced 
by other countries during the recession, and was subject to similar levels of protectionism 
traditionally imposed during the economic instability of recessions. Looking at all the data, it is 
clear China is exhibiting different trends than other U.S. trade partners in terms of having TTBs 
leveraged against them, and the evidence points to political factors as a possible explanation for 
these trends.  
Effect of TTBs on WTO Disputes 
TTBs themselves do not cause large-scale trade conflicts, though they are by far the most 
common source of WTO disputes. Between China’s ascension to the WTO on December 11, 
2001 and the end of 2006 the United States and China were involved in three WTO disputes,4 
two initiated by the U.S. and one by China. However, since 2007, when the presages of the 
economic recession began to appear, 20 WTO disputes have occurred between the two countries, 
13 initiated by the United States and seven initiated by China (see Figure 2 below). The average 
annual rate of WTO disputes between these two countries increased a staggering 5.5 times 
between the 2002-2006 and 2007-2012 periods, with bilateral trade increasing just 2.6 times 
between 2002 and 2007 (Census 2012). While China becoming accustomed to the WTO 
certainly played a role in this disputes increase (Ji & Huang 2011), the most complete 
explanation for the increase is the beginning of the recession. The spike in disputes can be traced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the WTO, if a country desires to lodge a dispute against another country, they must “request consultation” with 
them. The two countries are then given a 60-day period to come to an agreement. If no agreement is reached, the 
WTO establishes an independent to panel make a ruling. The vast majority of U.S./China disputes are resolved 
during these consultations, but even getting to the point of “requesting consultation” demonstrates high levels of 
economic contention. Therefore, in this analysis I do not distinguish between cases that resorted to panels and those 
that did not, referring to both types generally as “WTO disputes” or “WTO complaints.” Both case studies involve 
disputes for which a WTO panel was established. 	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back to 2007, when warning signs of financial trouble and economic slowdown began to appear, 
and disputes remained high throughout the recession period. While most countries did not 
experience heightened trade tensions with the U.S. during the recession period, non-economic 
factors pushed conflicts between China and the U.S. to record highs.  
Beyond the number of disputes, the type of disputes also reveals clues to the evolving 
nature of U.S./ China trade conflicts. Every WTO complaint initiated by China against the U.S., 
regardless of year, can be categorized as offensive, or attempting to protect Chinese firms’ ability 
to export to the U.S. Indeed, since 2007, six of the seven complaints lodged by China have been 
challenges to U.S. implementation of TTBs. Equally telling are the types of U.S. initiated 
disputes. Of the 14 total U.S. initiated WTO disputes against China, 11 are classified as 
offensive. However, all three of the U.S.’s defensive disputes, those attempting to limit imports 
from China, have been initiated since the recession began in 2008. Overall, the data suggests 
U.S. import protection has increased in importance as a cause of WTO disputes since the 
recession began. 
Figure 2 
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Case Studies 
Chinese Tires 
 Fears that imports from China are undercutting U.S. manufactured goods and leading to 
unemployment is a major cause of the rise in protectionist measures towards China during the 
recession demonstrated in the model. However, policies meant to protect manufacturing 
consistently prove largely detrimental to the U.S. economy they are designed to protect, 
suggesting misinformation and politics are influencing policy. For example, the Obama 
administration levied a tariff on imports of Chinese produced car and truck tires in 2009. While 
the tariff was positioned as an attempt to save jobs and reboot the economy, in actuality it proved 
economically harmful, largely politically motivated, and contributed to further trade conflicts 
between the U.S. and China.  
 In April 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, 
Allied Industrial, and Service Workers International Union, which represents tire manufacturing 
workers, filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) requesting a 
Section 421 investigation of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires imported from China. 
Section 421 was created by the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and states that if imports of a 
product from a “non-market economy” are in such quantities that they cause, or threaten to cause 
a “market disruption” to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, the ITC can 
propose a tariff remedy and send it to the President, who can then approve, modify, or reject it. 
Under bilateral accords that were part of its agreement to support China’s accession to the WTO 
in 2001, the U.S. can consider China a non-market economy for the purpose of instituting this 
type of tariff, though the tires tariff was the first time this provision was enacted. The ITC report 
found that increases in both quantity and value of Chinese tire imports were “large, rapid, and 
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continuing” (ITC 2009a) during the period from 2004-2008, and that this increase hurt domestic 
producers, as “virtually all the industry indicators declined during that period” (ITC 2009a). The 
ITC recommended an ad valorem duty on imported Chinese tires of 55 percent for the first year 
(2009-2010), 45 percent for the second year (2010-2011), and 35 percent for the final year 
(2011-2012). On September 11, 2009, President Obama approved the tariff (though he lowered 
the annual rates to 35, 30, and 25 percent), fulfilling a 2008 campaign promise that he would do 
so (Richburg 2011). 
WTO bylaws generally demand countries demonstrate their trade partner is engaging in 
some unfair or illegal activity, such as dumping or government subsidies, to justify a trade 
barrier. However, due to Section 421 and the terms of China’s WTO accession, the ITC only had 
to demonstrate goods from China were causing a “market disruption” to justify a tariff, not that 
China’s trade practices were “unfair.” The inclusion of Section 421 in the Trade Act of 1974 and 
insisting on China’s “non-market economy” distinction in 2001 demonstrate the U.S. has long 
been fearful of potential economic harm from trading with “non-market economies.” While the 
U.S. had never invoked this clause before 2009, by September of that year the unemployment 
rate had risen to 9.8 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013), awakening latent fears of high 
unemployment caused by imports from China, and prompting the federal government to approve 
a tariff on Chinese tires.  
 Though Section 421 had never previously been levied against China, 2009 was not the 
first time an investigation occurred. The ITC underwent six Section 421 investigations involving 
China between 2000 and 2009, and in four reached a decision affirming that a “market 
disruption” had occurred. However, President George W. Bush did not approve a tariff in any of 
these four cases. The trade policies of Presidents Bush and Obama clearly differ and cannot be 
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directly compared, but nevertheless the highest unemployment rate during Bush’s eight years in 
office was 6.3 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013), far below the 9.8 percent under which 
Obama approved the first use of Section 421 on imports from China. Obama had consistently 
stated creating jobs, particularly in manufacturing, is his number one priority. This promise, 
coupled with skyrocketing unemployment and U.S. Steel’s claim “non-market” China was 
stealing American jobs, created substantial political pressure on the Obama administration to 
increase pressure on China and enact the tariff.  
Economic and Political Impact of the Tires Tariff 
The tariff did not create the desired economic effect for the U.S. While the initiative 
saved a maximum of 1,200 U.S. manufacturing jobs, the cost to U.S. consumers was estimated at 
$1.1 billion (Hufbauer and Lowry 2012). This means the cost per manufacturing job saved was 
over  $900,000 in 2011, demonstrating the economic inefficiency of the tariff. Additionally, the 
tariff may have actually caused net job loss in the U.S., as an estimated 2,531 jobs were lost in 
the tire retail industry due to higher prices and lower demand. Furthermore, the small economic 
benefit from the tariff did not go to domestic factory workers. As a spokesman from American 
tire manufacturer Goodyear explained “The tariffs didn’t have any material impact on our North 
American business. The stuff coming in from China is primarily low-end. We got out of that 
market years ago” (Rapoza 2012). Because U.S. producers, like Goodyear, do not compete with 
Chinese tire manufacturers in the low end of the market, manufacturers from Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Mexico reaped the economic benefit by filling much of the demand previously 
met by Chinese tires. 
 Despite the failure of the tires tariff in the economic arena, it was largely a success in the 
political arena. President Obama appeased U.S. Steel, one of the largest U.S. unions, part of 
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rallying his domestic support base as Democrats began the process of passing the Affordable 
Care Act (Andrews 2009). For Obama, the 1,200 jobs saved by the tariff could be used in his 
narrative of constraining China and protecting jobs, which he employed often during his 2012 
Presidential re-election campaign. Manufacturing’s political saliency, combined with the power 
of unions, fostered both political pressure and opportunity that encouraged President Obama to 
support the tires tariff. China responded promptly, filing a complaint with the WTO on 
September 14, 2009. However, the WTO panel ruled in favor of the U.S. on all counts, 
upholding the right of the U.S. to impose Section 421 tariffs on China, and ruling the U.S. 
provided sufficient evidence that Chinese tires were hurting the domestic market, despite the fact 
the rate of Chinese tire exports to the U.S. slowed in 2008. Subsequently, in April 2009 China 
enacted a 100 percent anti-dumping tariff on imported U.S. chickens’ feet, a move many 
described as retaliation for the tire tariff. The U.S. subsequently filed a WTO dispute over the 
Chinese tariff in a case that is yet to be ruled on by the WTO.  
Chinese Solar Panels 
 Similarly, in May 2012 the Commerce Department announced a 31 percent tariff on 
imports of Chinese solar panels, in addition to the 2.9 to 4.73 percent duties they had already 
announced in March. Seven months earlier, in October 2011, the Coalition for American Solar 
Manufacturing (CASM) accused China of providing illegal export subsidies to Chinese solar 
firms, and claimed these firms were dumping, or setting prices in the U.S. below market value in 
order to drive out domestic competition and increase market share. The solar industry has 
become a focal point of U.S./China trade relations in recent years, as both countries view growth 
in this industry as vital for driving their national economies, as well as a promising source of 
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potential jobs	  (Obama 2012 & Bradsher 2013). Both the U.S. and China targeted the U.S. as their 
primary market to sell solar panels, heightening competition and tensions. 
 China is, by all accounts, guilty as accused of violating WTO rules by subsidizing and 
dumping solar panels. However, while the tariff was legally justified it was still economically 
harmful to the U.S., pointing to political factors outside of policy analysis influencing its 
implementation. In 2010, Chinese state-run banks loaned up to $32.6 billion to large Chinese 
solar firms such as LDK, Trina, Yingli, and Suntech (Wesoff 2011). Additionally, input prices 
for Chinese panels and the domestic price of Chinese produced panels demonstrate the price of 
Chinese solar panels in the U.S. fell below market value. These tactics proved successful for the 
Chinese, as they captured over 80 percent of the global solar panel manufacturing market by 
2013 (Plumer 2013), exporting over 99 percent of what they produced, with the U.S. and E.U. as 
their primary markets. The U.S. imported $1.5 billion in Chinese solar goods in 2010, compared 
to $1.1 billion in Chinese tires the year the tire tariff went into effect. 
China, however, was not the only government promoting solar panel manufacturing. As 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Obama administration’s 
economic stimulus package), the U.S. government loaned over $527 million to the U.S. solar 
firm Solyndra and granted them substantial tax breaks, and instituted a program known as 
Section 1603, allowing renewable energy project owners to recover three percent of their 
construction costs in cash, a program that has so far distributed more than $2.7 billion dollars 
(Ebling 2012). The goal of these policies was to finance an industry struggling to procure capital 
in the wake of the financial meltdown. Policymakers believed the solar panel industry could both 
promote environmental sustainability as well as create domestic manufacturing jobs. Despite 
large investments by the federal government, American made solar panels could not compete 
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with the prices of Chinese panels, and Chinese firms quickly gained the lion’s share of the U.S. 
solar market, estimated at up to 80 percent. U.S. firms suffered as a result and on August 31, 
2011 Solyndra announced it was filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, costing the government 
hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid loans. In this environment of bankrupt U.S. firms and 
an explosion of Chinese solar panels in the domestic market, the Commerce Department 
investigation into Chinese solar panels began, just 49 days after Solyndra filed for bankruptcy.  
Economic and Political Impact of the Solar Panels Tariff 
The May 2012 tariff announced by the Department of Commerce applied to all imports of 
Chinese crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, the cells used in solar panels, even when the cells 
are assembled into solar panels in the U.S. Just as in the case of Chinese tires, while a political 
success, the tariff was economically harmful domestically. Of the approximately 100,000 
employees in the U.S. solar panel industry, 52 percent work in installation. As solar prices rose 
in the U.S. demand for both panels and panel installation decreased, leading to an estimated loss 
of 10,000 to 40,000 solar panel installation jobs in the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. is a net 
exporter of solar products to China by $200 million, prompting worries the tariff could provoke a 
reaction from China and put these U.S. exports at risk (Huffbauer & Vieiro, 2012). Indeed, this 
fear became a reality, as China placed large retaliatory tariffs on imports of U.S. polysilicon, 
which has proved disastrous for U.S. firms (Washington Post Editorial Board 2013). Many U.S. 
individuals and businesses were from the onset deeply concerned about the effects of the solar 
panel tariff, evidenced by the Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy, a 700 member group of 
individuals and companies involved in the solar industry, strongly opposing the tariff (Huffbauer 
& Vieiro 2012). 
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Despite the negative economic effects of the solar panels tariff, for the Obama 
administration it was a political victory. The tariff was most beneficial for U.S. solar 
manufacturers, placating lobbyists and individuals concerned with manufacturing’s decline. 
Furthermore, the tariffs allowed Obama to be seen as tough on the “cheating” Chinese. During 
the 2012 Presidential election Mitt Romney attacked Obama for both the failure of Solyndra and 
for not being tough enough on China, declaring the government should not pick “winners and 
losers,” and promising to label China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. The tariff 
afforded Obama political protection from the Solyndra debacle, and allowed him to claim that he 
had in fact been tough on China, while playing into the popular notion that China is a threat to 
the U.S. economy.  
In September 2012, China filed a complaint with the WTO, claiming they were neither 
subsidizing nor dumping solar panels, and therefore the U.S. tariff is in violation of WTO rules. 
The WTO panel set up to address the issue has not yet completed its investigation and issued a 
ruling. The political environment during the recession prompted policymakers in both the U.S. 
(and China) to protect the solar panel industry, and to promote the sale of panels in the U.S. This 
resulted in direct competition between the two countries and ultimately to a WTO dispute with 
disastrous economic repercussions for both countries. The U.S. solar installation industry sharply 
declined as a result of the tariff, negatively impacting consumers and resulting in the loss of 
thousands of jobs. China oversupplied the market with subsidized panels, leading prices to fall 
up to 75 percent between 2008 and 2012. This, combined with the U.S. tariff and a similar tariff 
imposed by the E.U., led many Chinese solar companies to lose profitability. In March 2012 the 
main subsidiary of Chinese solar panel producer Suntech Power, the largest solar production 
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company in the world, declared bankruptcy, the knockout blow for a battered Chinese solar 
industry (Bradsher 2013).  
Discussion  
 In the	  cases of both tires and solar panels, protectionist tariffs proved economically 
harmful. The tires tariff cost U.S. consumers over one billion dollars, and virtually eliminated 
Chinese tire exports to the U.S. The solar panels tariff led to the loss of tens of thousands of 
American jobs in the solar panel industry, as well as higher prices. Chinese solar firms also 
suffered as a result of the U.S. tariffs, experiencing plummeting profitability. Clearly, the 
decisions to implement these tariffs lacked sound economic judgment, as the harmful results 
were predictable outcomes, forewarned by economists and industry groups like the Coalition for 
Affordable Solar Energy. Rather, these policies were enacted because they were publicly popular 
and could be leveraged for political gain.  
 Constraining China’s growing economic influence is often framed as preventing China 
from cheating. China bends or outright violates many international trade agreements, often 
subsidizing specific industries and engaging in predatory dumping. This precipitates political 
rhetoric focused on forcing China to “play by the rules,” a moralistic claim pitting the liberal free 
trade economic policies of the U.S. against the state-run economy of China.  Indeed, the U.S. is 
often preoccupied with making China adhere to the letter of the law even when it is not in its 
economic best interest, exemplified in the cases of the tires and solar panels. Attempting to 
enforce international trade laws can become less about what is best for the U.S. economy, and 
more about forcing China into the U.S.’s vision for a rules-based, capitalist global political order. 
 Perhaps the clearest example of this, outside of the U.S.’s use of protectionist trade 
measures, is the current debate over China’s currency regime. China is accused of using its 
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central bank bond buying program to artificially suppress the value of its currency, the renminbi. 
This lowers prices of Chinese exports, making them more attractive, and allows for China to 
increase exports, central to its economic growth. While there is no consensus among scholars, 
the most common view is that the renminbi likely is undervalued, and allowing the renminbi to 
float (depend on the market for its value) could benefit the economies of both the U.S. and China 
(Moosa 2011). Regardless of what the actual value of the renmibi is, the Chinese central bank 
certainly does intervene in currency rates, in violation of WTO and IMF rules. However, 
allowing the renminbi to float would likely only have a marginal impact on the U.S. economy. 
The renmibi appreciated approximately 25 percent relative to the dollar between 2009 and 2011 
(Gross 2012), yet this did nothing to hamper Chinese exports to the U.S., even though many 
believe the renminbi is now very close to its market value. Complaints against the undervalued 
renminbi are in fact tied to perceptions about manufacturing: an undervalued currency means 
Chinese goods are cheaper and therefore favorably compete with U.S. manufactures. Yet, as 
demonstrated earlier, China has a significant cost advantage in manufactured goods that is not 
likely to be erased by small currency shifts. While the potential benefits of aggressively 
pressuring China to let the renminbi float are small, the risks are significant. Labeling China a 
currency manipulator for trade purposes, a common policy recommendation, has the potential to 
elicit a response from China that could usher in a trade war, putting at risk hundreds of billions 
of dollars of bilateral trade. 
  While an aggressive confrontation of China’s currency manipulation does not make 
economic sense, that has not prevented politicians from making it a key political issue. Obama 
promised to designate China a currency manipulator during his 2008 campaign, and instituted a 
series of investigations into China’s currency regime once in office, though he shied away from 
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actually labeling China a currency manipulator. This decision was attacked by Romney during 
his campaign, as he accused Obama of not being “tough on China.” Romney promised to label 
China a currency manipulator “on day one,” and when asked if he was formally accusing China 
of manipulating its currency and starting a trade war he replied “There’s one going on right now, 
which we don’t know about it. It’s a silent one. And they’re winning” (Branigan 2012). Romney 
also consistently repeated that labeling China a currency manipulator was part of an attempt to 
get them “to play by the rules.”  
While many question whether Romney would have actually followed through on his 
promise, nevertheless the fact that labeling China a currency manipulator has been part of the 
platforms of Presidential candidates from two different parties, both trying to appeal to the 
American people at large, is telling. First, it underlines the importance of manufacturing to the 
public, as China’s undervalued currency gives it an edge over the U.S. in selling manufactured 
products (though, as often ignored in public rhetoric, it also keeps prices much lower for 
consumers). Second, it points to the willingness of policymakers to take economic risks to 
counter the economic and political jostling of China. While the risks of labeling China a currency 
manipulator clearly outweigh the rewards, this policy still makes it onto the agendas of 
Presidential candidates and members of Congress alike. This points to a larger issue in 
U.S./China relations, not present between the U.S. and most of its other trade partners. When 
dealing with U.S./China trade, both the public and policymakers are constantly looking beyond 
economics to security and geopolitical concerns, wanting to keep China in check, and in their 
“proper place” in the world political order. 
Policy Implications  
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 Given the economic damages caused by recent protectionist measures imposed by the 
U.S. on China, and the strain they place on Sino-American trade relations, the obvious policy 
recommendation is to reduce the use of protectionist tariffs. However, this is easier said than 
done. As demonstrated, the U.S. does not use TTBs and other protectionist measures because 
policy analysis has deemed them economically efficient and beneficial for U.S./China trade 
relations. Rather, these protectionist measures are implemented because they appeal to special 
interests directly tied to the manufacturing industry, and those with misconceptions about the 
importance of manufacturing in the U.S. economy. China’s state-controlled economy, and 
broader uncertainty about its larger geopolitical objectives, only compounds fears that massive 
imports of Chinese goods are harmful to the U.S. Observing these public attitudes, politicians 
consciously associate themselves with the manufacturing industry, and contend they will curb 
Chinese cheating and revive manufacturing. These platforms normally come in spite of the 
advice of their top economic advisors (Goldfarb 2012). In order to reduce U.S. protectionism and 
improve trade relations with China, public misconceptions and misleading political rhetoric must 
be addressed.  
 Agenda setting and rhetoric by politicians has a substantial influence on public opinion. 
Therefore, a shift in the way politicians address economic and trade issues will impact the 
public’s views, and in turn will impact policy. Shifting away from a focus on job creation in 
manufacturing and towards job creation in services is essential. The true economic strength of 
the U.S. lies in its research and technology, legal and financial services, entrepreneurship, and 
other service industries, rather than in heavy manufacturing. If politicians channel their rhetoric 
towards promoting these segments of the economy, pressure will be eased on politicians to 
safeguard the U.S. from Chinese exports. When pressured to crack down on China, politicians 
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can point to the fact that even when China does break the rules, American consumers actually 
benefit from lower prices. The impact on consumers is often ignored when discussing economic 
policy, yet lower prices on basic goods directly impacts all Americans, and should have broad 
appeal. Politicians need incentives to switch away popular rhetoric like promoting manufacturing 
and China bashing. Through more widely accessible and promulgated economic and policy 
analysis by politicians and think tanks alike, a shift away from current rhetoric can be politically 
feasible. 
 Limiting imports from China is beneficial to those directly involved in the manufacturing 
industry, even if it is not to society as a whole. Imports from China have been demonstrated to 
cause localized unemployment in labor markets with which they directly compete (David et. al 
2012), and these impacted groups lobby hard to restrain imports from China. Leveraging 
government resources currently used to bolster non-competitive manufacturing to support job 
training for impacted groups would be beneficial. As the U.S. becomes more and more of a 
services oriented economy, educational and job-training programs need to reflect this shift. A 
recent survey revealed 59 percent U.S. business executives believe the U.S. education system 
needs to better prepare future generations of workers, and 44 percent believe the largest skill gap 
for American workers is soft skills, such as communication, critical thinking, creativity, and 
collaboration (Adeco 2013).  Emphasizing these skills in schools and job training programs will 
better prepare workers for success in the U.S.’s service oriented economy.  
When shifts in rhetoric and public opinion make it politically feasible, politicians can 
begin to address the trade policies themselves. As the U.S. and China adapt to China’s new role 
in the global economy, policymakers from both countries must work to insure the transition is 
smooth, and relatively small disputes do not escalate into economically crippling conflicts. The 
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best way to prevent future trade conflicts between the U.S. and China is through further 
economic liberalization. For China, this means eliminating export subsidies that enable 
oversupply and dumping in the U.S., and an overall reduction in the government’s role in the 
economy. For the U.S., further liberalization means allowing domestic industries, particularly 
manufacturing, to be exposed to more foreign competition, and not singling out China for the 
imposition of protectionist measures. The U.S. needs to understand that even when China 
“cheats,” it ultimately still serves to benefit American consumers, and the U.S.’s true economic 
power lies in its technical expertise, not manufacturing capabilities. Liberalization has been the 
dominant narrative of U.S./China trade relations over the past 30 years, and if both countries 
increase their emphasis on continued liberalization disputes will be drastically reduced, and the 
economies and people of both nations will stand to benefit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   35	  
References 
 
Adeco Group (2013). Lack of Soft Skills Negatively Impacts Today’s U.S. Workforce. Adeco  
Group North America. September 30, 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.adeccoU.S.a.com/articles/Lack-of-Soft-Skills-Negatively-Impacts-Today's-
U.S.Workforce.html?id=218&url=/pressroom/pressreleases/Pages/Forms/AllItems.aspx&
templatE.U.rl=/adeccogroup/News/press-releases/Pages/press-release.aspx> 
 
Andrews, Edmund L. (2011). U.S. Adds Tariffs on Chinese Tires. The New York Times,  
September 11, 2011. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/business/global/12tires.html?_r=0>, accessed 
April 14, 2013. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013). Unemployment rate- Seasonally Adjusted. Available at: 
 <http://www.bls.gov/data/#unemployment>, Accessed April 13, 2013. 
 
Bown, Chad P. (2012). Global Antidumping Database. Available at: 
 <http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/>, accessed April 2, 2013. 
 
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (2003) “Protection and the Business Cycle,” Advances  
in Economic Analysis & Policy 3(1): 1-43. 
 
Bown, C.P. (2009). U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO. Fletcher F. World  
Aff., 33, 27. 
 
Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2012). Import Protection, Business Cycles, and Exchange  
Rates. 
 
Bradsher, Keith (2013). Chinese Solar Panel Giant is Tainted by Bankruptcy. The New York  
Times. March 20 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/energy-environment/chinese-solar-
companys-operating-unit-declares-bankruptcy.html?_r=0>. 
 
Branigan, Tania (2012). Mitt Romney renews promise to label China a currency manipulator.  
The Guardian. October 23 2012. Available at:  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/23/mitt-romney-china-currency-
manipulator>, accessed November 14, 2013. 
 
Carson, Iain (1998). The world as a single machine. The Economist, June 18, 1998. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/energy-environment/chinese-solar-
companys-operating-unit-declares-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed April 24 
2013. 
 
Census Bureau (2013). Trade in Goods with China. United States Census Bureau. <Available at:  
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2012>, accessed November 
14 2013. 
	   36	  
 
Chen, David W. (2010). China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads. The New York Times,  
October 9, 2010. Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/politics/10outsource.html?_r=0accessed>, 
accessed December 1 2013. 
 
Chongqing and Foshan (2010). China’s labour market: The next China. The Economist, July 29  
2010. Available at: 
<	  http://www.economist.com/node/16693397>, accessed April 24, 2013. 
 
David, H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2012). The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects  
of Import Competition in the United States (No. w18054). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
 
Deloitte (2011). Unwavering commitment: the public’s view of the manufacturing industry  
today. Manufacturing Institute. Available at:  
<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/U.S.%20cip%202011PublicViewonManufactu
ringReport%20090811.pdf>, accessed November 13 2013. 
 
Ebeling, Paul A. Jr. (2012). Obama admin under fire for Solar industry stimulus. International  
Business Times, October 10, 2012. Available at: 
<http://www.ibtimes.com/obama-admin-under-fire-solar-industry-stimulus-843905>, 
accessed April 24 2013. 
 
Goldfarb, Zachary A. (2012). Can Obama Save Manufacturing? The Washington Post, July 13,  
2012. Available at:  
<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-13/business/35487385_1_president-obama-
vice-president-biden-middle-class-jobs> 
 
Gross, Donald (2012). The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s rise and  
Avoid Another Cold War. New York: Bloomsbury. 
 
Huang, Yukon (2013). China’s Economy: Myth and Realities and Implications for the U.S.  
[Powerpoint slides]. Lecture at Duke University on April 7, 2007. 
 
Hufbauer, G. C., & Lowry, S. (2012). U.S. Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost (No. 
 PB12-9). 
 
Hufbauer, G.C., & Vieiro, M. (2012). U.S. Anti-Dumping on Chinese Sola Cells: A Costly Step.  
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 25th, 2012.  Available at: 
<http://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime/?p=2900>, accessed April 24, 2013. 
 
Hufbauer, G. C., & Woollacott, J. C. (2010). Trade Disputes Between China and the United  
States: Growing Pains so Far, Worse Ahead? European Yearbook of International  
Economic Law (EYIEL), Vol. 3 (2012), 31-88. 
	   37	  
 
ITC (U.S. International Trade Commission). (2009a). Certain Passenger Vehicles and Light  
Truck Tires, July. Washington. Available at: 
<www.ITC.gov/publications/safeguards/pub4085.pdf>, accessed April 14, 2013. 
 
ITC (U.S. International Trade Commission). (2009b). Press Release: ITC Announces Remedy  
Proposals in its China Safeguard Investigation Involving Imports of Certain Passenger 
and Light Truck Tires from China, June 29. Available at: 
<http://www.ITC.gov/press_room?news_release/2009/er0629gg1.htm>, accessed April 
14, 2013. 
 
International Trade Administration (1999). The Role of Services in the Modern U.S. Economy.  
Available at: 
< http://trade.gov/td/sif/PDF/ROLSERV199.PDF>, accessed November 14 2013. 
 
Ji, W., & Huang, C. (2011). China’s experience in dealing with WTO dispute settlement: A  
Chinese perspective. Journal of World Trade, 45(1), 1-37. 
 
Moosa, Iman (2011). On the U.S.-China trade dispute. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,  
34(1), 85-111. 
 
Richburg, Keith B. U.S., China embroiled in trade spat over chicken feet. The Washington Post,  
December 16, 2011. Available at:  
<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-12-16/world/35287460_1_chicken-feet-
poultry-industry-U.S.a-poultry>, accessed April 14, 2013. 
 
Obama, Barack. 2012. State of the Union Address. Available at: 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/. 
 
Organization for Action (2013). Issues- Economy. Economy. Available at:  
 <http://www.barackobama.com/economy/>, accessed November 14, 2013. 
 
Pew Research (2012). Public Deeply Concerned about China’s Economic Power. PewResearch  
Global Attitudes Project, September 18, 2012. Available at: 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/09/18/u-s-public-experts-differ-on-china-policies/> 
 
Plumer, Brad (2013). China may soon stop flooding the world with cheap solar panels. The  
Washington Post, March 23 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/23/china-might-stop-
providing-the-world-with-cheap-solar-panels/>, April 24 2013. 
 
Rapoza, Kenneth (2012) Obama’s Half-Truth On China Tire Tariffs. Forbes, January 25 2012.  
Available at: 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/01/25/obamas-half-truth-on-china-tire-
tariffs/>, accessed November 14 2013. 
 
	   38	  
Schuman, Michael. (2011). Why do we fear a rising China? Time: Business and Money. June  
7, 2011. Available at:  
<http://business.time.com/2011/06/07/why-do-we-fear-a-rising-china/>, accessed April  
14, 2013. 
 
Washington Post Editorial Board (2013). U.S. tariffs on Chinese solar panels boomerang. The  
Washington Post, August 12, 2013. Available at: 
<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-12/opinions/41330381_1_u-s-tariffs-
polysilicon-chinese-trade-practices>, accessed November 26, 2013. 
 
Wesoff, Eric (2011). The Reality of China’s Billions in Solar Loans. Greentech Solar,  
September 28 2011. Available at: 
<	  http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Reality-of-Chinas-Billions-in-Solar-
Loans>, accessed April 14, 2013. 
 
Wolfe, R. (2012). Protectionism and Multilateral Accountability During the Great Recession:  
Drawing Inferences from Dogs Not Barking. Journal of World Trade, 46(4), 777-814. 
 
A World of Work (2004). A world a work: A survey of outsourcing. The Economist, November  
13 2004. 
 
World Bank (2013). China GDP Growth Rate. World Bank Data. Available at: 
 <	  http://data.worldbank.org/>, accessed April 24, 2013. 
 
WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, available at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm>, accessed 23 March 
2013. 
 
Zhuang, Wei (2011) “An Empirical Study of China’s Participation in the WTO Dispute  
Settlement Mechanism: 2001-2010,” The Law and Development Review: Vol. 4: No. 1, 
Article 6. 
 
2012 Presidential Election Documents (2012). The American Presidency Project. <Available at:  
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/2012_election.php>, accessed November 13 2013. 
 
